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PARETO OPTIMALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW

In 1959, James M. Buchanan criticized the collectivist misuse of Pareto optimality by the
"new welfare economists" and made a first attempt to extend that individualist concept into the
political realm.1 Over the following three decades he further developed his political application
of Pareto’s insight to buttress an essentially economic analysis of political exchange that would
justify the processes of constitutional democracy in the same way Pareto efficiency justifies free
markets. In this paper I will explain why Buchanan’s particular formulations will not work and
propose a more comprehensive solution that accomplishes Buchanan’s announced purpose. I
will argue that a conventionalist understanding of the rule of law provides a precise and
appropriate application of the Pareto criterion in the legal and political realm.
The Pareto criterion has been recognized for some time as a regulative norm by which the
efficiency of an economy can be measured in terms of the extent to which the preferences held by
individuals were satisfied. The point at which no further voluntary exchanges would take place
marks a theoretical point at which everyone is as well off as possible, measured in terms of their
own preferences. This differs from utilitarian and other approaches by taking the preferences of
individual choosers as facts to be accommodated, not ignored or corrected.
The rule of law has been understood and defined in many ways, including as a regulative
norm by some twentieth century legal, economic, and political theorists. Both F. A. Hayek2 and
Lon L. Fuller3 have seen in this traditional legal concept an implicit guideline or measure of
freedom as contrasted with tyranny. Michael Oakeshott further clarifies that observing rule of
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law in a polity is a means of ensuring that people are able to use their lives for their own
purposes.4
I. Pareto and Wicksell in Buchanan's Political Economy.
Like other European sociologists and founders of welfare economics at the turn of the
century, Pareto believed that social values should play a role in public policy analysis. But he
also saw the need to transcend the necessity of interpersonal comparisons in utilitarian analyses.
Pareto accomplished this by shifting the analysis away from any kind of social calculation and
focusing on the choices people actually make.
We are, hence, led to define a position of maximum ophelimity5 as one where it is
impossible to make a small change of any sort such that the ophelimities of all individuals
with the exception of those that remain constant, are either all increased or all
diminished.6
Public choice theorists, following Buchanan, emphasize an individualist interpretation of Pareto
by assuming the given distribution and focusing on whether individual actors would choose
voluntarily to make further exchanges. If not, the system is at an optimum, according to the
values of its individual members--the only values which matter.
When Buchanan talks about Pareto optimality from this perspective, he clarifies that he is
using the term in a "Wicksellian" contractarian framework.7 By this he means that the exchange
nexus is the most viable test for the unanimous consent of all interested parties and the best
indicator of whether their welfare can be improved by any proposed trade or change, a notion he
attributes to the nineteenth century economist Knut Wicksell. The difficulty faced by political
economists who want to achieve Pareto efficiency in the social policy realm is that the unanimity
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that characterizes market exchanges is not readily imaginable as a feature of any process of social
policy formation. But, if you follow the individualist assumptions of most economics and liberal
political theory (social values do not exist apart from individual values) and assume that
voluntary trade is proof of mutual gains, then "consensus or unanimity (mutuality of gain) is the
only test which can insure that a change is beneficial."8
While the basic models of Pareto and Wicksell were indeed compatible and mutually
supporting in most important respects, these two great turn-of-the-century social scientists were
implacably opposed to one another.9 It was Buchanan's genius that saw the essential similarity of
their important insights and brought them together in his own work.10 More recently, as his
interpretation of Pareto has been challenged, Buchanan has tended to emphasize his dependence
on Wicksell for the unanimity notion, speaking of the Pareto test "interpreted in Wicksellian
terms."11
Buchanan looks back to Knut Wicksell, not only for the insight that unanimity is the
correct ideal for social decision-making, but also for the recognition that some procedure for
achieving approximate unanimity is necessary in the real world. While there may be a course all
reasonable men would agree to, not all men will be reasonable all the time. This forces Wicksell
(and Buchanan) into vague compromise positions, but does not drive them to anything like
simple majority rule, which Buchanan and his co-authors have criticized so effectively:12
"Here the absolute unanimity rule must be broken; the political economist must try, as
best he can, to judge the extent of unanimity required to verify (not refute) his hypothesis.
Some less definitive rule of relative unanimity must be substituted for full agreement, as
Wicksell recognized and suggested."13
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In 1959 this logic drove Buchanan to endorse the principle of compensation to ensure
consensus. Wicksell had previously advanced the idea that tax levies and national budgets
should require parliamentary super-majorities of 75)90 percent.14 Buchanan's later work with
Gordon Tullock and others demonstrates his full awareness and concern for the problems of lessthan-unanimous decision making. But to this day, he (like Wicksell) sees the political problem
of achieving Pareto efficiency as a direct parallel of market efficiency, and focuses on models of
political exchange as the means by which some form of unanimity or near-unanimity can be
achieved. Comparing Wicksell's "contractarian framework" to the "quasi-utilitarian framework
of orthodox welfare economics," Buchanan understands the Wicksellian approach and its
emphasis on unanimity as "a straightforward extension of the exchange nexus."15 As I explain
below and elsewhere, a less direct analogy in the political and legal realms may provide a more
natural and less strained solution.16
1. Using the Pareto Criterion in Welfare Economics.
In his 1959 entrée to these matters, Buchanan showed that whereas welfare economists
"have generally assumed omniscience in the observer," this necessarily means that the observer
must rely on "his own estimate of his subjects' value scales," rather than their actual values in
making policy recommendations.17 This is unavoidable because the subjects' values are only
revealed in actual choices and cannot be known in advance by anyone. Because ethical
evaluations are necessarily introduced by the observer in this process, each variation of this
approach "constitutes a distortion of the Pareto rule."18 To maintain social efficiency in the true
Paretian spirit, we must look not at the good or bad health (measured by some external value) of
the political system, but rather to the level of "agreement" in the system.
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"The political behavior of individuals, not market performance or results, provides
the criteria for testing hypotheses of political economy."19
This analysis led Buchanan to conclude that a true application of Pareto’s efficiency
criterion to social policy changes would require compensation to losers. No one can be made
worse off, and agreement is the only acceptable measure of welfare so understood. "'Welfare' is
defined as that which is expressed by individual preference as revealed in behavior."20 Buchanan
saw his insistence on the compensation device as another way of defending "the classical liberal
conception of democracy itself."21
2. Unanimity in Political Economy.
Three years after his first article on the topic, James Buchanan took up Pareto optimality
and its political implications once again in the context of a critique of the way welfare
economists were misusing the idea.22 He again objected to the inevitable intrusion of "social
value judgments" or "social welfare functions" by those who wanted to use the Pareto criterion to
classify results (1962: 341).23 Going beyond his 1959 discussion of a compensation principle, he
argued that "the criterion must be extended to classify social rules which constrain the private
individual behavior."24
Buchanan developed this point by distinguishing between the choices of particular
economic outcomes (results) in a society and the choices of frameworks of rules within which
people make the decisions that produce those outcomes. While welfare economists tend to use
the Pareto criterion to evaluate and predict outcomes, their proposals are always in terms of
policy or changes in the governing body of rules. So the true relevance of the Pareto criterion for
welfare economics is in the analysis of alternative sets of rules, not results. To demonstrate this
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point, Buchanan provides us with straightforward examples in which standard evaluation of
results indicates sub-optimal situations by Pareto standards while the rules generating the
situations may themselves be optimal in that there may be no way of
"securing [voluntary] consensus on any change. Thus, the mere demonstration of
some violation of Pareto optimality in the orthodox classification of results may
not be sufficient to suggest that some change in policy is dictated."25
While it might seem that Buchanan's constant movement back and forth between
discussions of changes "in policy," "in the constitutional structure," or "in the 'social
constitution'" erases any significant differences between these, the conflation actually helps
reveal the basic logic of his position. All choice and action take place within a situation
structured and bounded by different kinds of rules. The particular hierarchy of rules does not
matter so much for this analysis. The entire package of policies, rules, and constitutional
provisions defines the region of private action, the results of which can be assessed by welfare
economists for Pareto optimality. But the more important question that Buchanan has identified
is whether the rules defining those regions are themselves optimal. And the test he proposes,
following the pure logic of Pareto optimality, is unanimity:
"If a presumed or apparent nonoptimal rule cannot be changed through agreement
among members of the group, the hypothesis stating that the rule is nonoptimal is
effectively refuted."26
And,
"All possible changes in the constitutional structure become admissible so long as
these rules changes may, conceptually, be approved by general agreement. The
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unanimity principle for changes in the 'social constitution' provides the only
appropriate facultative constraint."27
Though I fully endorse Buchanan's shifting to a focus on the rules which define the
situation in which economic choices are made, it seems to me that his attempt to apply the Pareto
criterion to the choosing of rules cannot work. It is a move that arises from Buchanan's
assumption that the process of constitutional choice is best understood as a process of
exchange))like a market. But it overlooks the fundamental difference in that the unanimity he
admires in market choosing never requires everyone in the society to agree with everyone else
consciously and explicitly. It is a de facto unanimity which results when the myriad of economic
exchanges between individuals are all voluntary. But this is a special kind of agreement, and
certainly does not imply that everyone agreed before the fact that the actual state of affairs was to
be desired or chosen by the group. That kind of agreement would never be possible in markets
either. But social choices about rules are of this kind. When we choose rules, we choose to
redefine the situation of all future activity for everyone. It would seem that we have a problem of
apples and oranges, and the assumption that constitutional choice is reducible to an exchange
process must be defended against our intuitive doubts. While no one will deny the existence of a
process of political exchange, it is always aimed at achieving the required majorities, and not
unanimity.
Of course, Buchanan does recognize the virtual impossibility of achieving actual
unanimity in such matters and here introduces the concept of "the costs of reaching agreement."
Rather than undergo such costs, "members of the group may decide, in the constitutional process,
to accept the departures from Pareto-optimality that less-than-unanimity voting rules may
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produce."28 But we may ask, will they decide this unanimously? The problem persists, possibly
in an infinite regress. Any decision process that requires agreement across a society will run
aground on the free rider problem. And any compromise with the unanimity requirement fails to
preserve the justifying logic of the Pareto criterion.
It seems to me that Buchanan's instincts are exactly right in searching for the most
important form of Pareto optimality in the rules of the legal society which define the space within
which private action takes place. And he also has to be right in his insistence that as in market
activity, unanimity in decision making is the appropriate index of optimality. What does not
seem to work as well is the direct assumed parallel between the making of choices by market
actors in their limited and self-chosen exchange situations, and social decision making which by
its very nature involves every citizen and can hardly ever achieve unanimity.
It is precisely at this point that the conventionalist theory of law described below provides
a standard which meets the requirements of Pareto optimality without compromising on social
decision-making rules. The rule of law properly describes polities which implicitly regulate all
rules changes and policy changes in such a way that constructive unanimity is preserved.
Changes which satisfy the principles of rule of law can be seen as fully conventional, based only
in agreement and not in coercion. And this amounts to a political-legal equivalent of the Pareto
test in economics.
Wicksell was Buchanan's forerunner and inspiration in the effort to preserve the voluntary
character of human society by bringing the standard of unanimity or "approximate unanimity"
into the realm of constitutional choice. "Wicksell's theoretical interest was to articulate general
constitutional principles to which a government must adhere if it is meaningfully to reflect the
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consent of the governed."29 For this his work has been recognized by public choice theorist
Richard Wagner as "the first effort at constitutional construction."30
II. The Rule of Law in Political and Legal Theory.
It is common in the century of legal positivism to think of law first as a means of social
control. The implication is that some people are controlling others and maintaining order
through the manipulation and enforcement of legal rules. On this view, the purposes of the rules
are the purposes of those who have the power to manipulate others. The effectiveness or
appropriateness of a legal system or of any particular legal rule will obviously be measured in
terms of its contribution to this purpose. Positivists will tend to understand the rule of law as
obedience to law or supremacy of law, without attendant notions of implicit limits on law itself.
On this approach, rule of law comes off looking rather weak and useless, except for propaganda
purposes, as it finally protects no one from anything.
A persistent counter tradition understands law as a function of social agreements designed
to protect and facilitate the freedom of each citizen in the pursuit of his or her self-chosen ends.
The law's purpose is to provide a neutral framework for social interaction and individual action
that will facilitate cooperative behavior while protecting all from the arbitrary interference or
control of others. Thinkers in this tradition have identified the rule of law with individual liberty
and the devices or principles that protect individuals from governmental control or manipulation.
Positivist critics have taken this to be a poorly disguised assertion of an ideological view
of law, whether it be libertarian or just liberal in a more classical sense. Admittedly, the
defenders of this more substantial and limiting notion of rule of law frequently retreat to the selfevident value of individual liberty as a justification for their proposals. This does not satisfy
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critics who would like to see equality and other values given the same consideration. Nor does it
satisfy those who believe a theory of law should not be tied to any particular ideological position.
The inadequacy of either view, taken by itself, is generally recognized by contemporary
legal theorists. Positivist theory has proven incapable of explaining our most persistent intuition
about law, our sense of obligation to obey a rule just because it is valid law. But natural law
theory has proven incapable of explaining law as a social fact, often independent of any moral
principles. And our modern understanding of the origins and process of law tends to reduce
much valid law to nothing more edifying than facts about who wanted and got what when.
III. Law as Convention.
The conventionalist theory of law preserves the basic insights of both these approaches.
It advances a notion of rule of law derived from social fact rather than ideology, as required by
positivists, while providing normative structure and limitation as required by value based
approaches.31 The beginning claim of this approach is that social situations in which parties are
coerced to conform to a norm are categorially distinct from those in which individuals voluntarily
coordinate their actions in mutual expectation of benefit. Though it is clear that lovers of liberty
will champion the latter situation and despise the former, the claim that the two are factually
distinguishable requires no moral evaluation. My theory of law derives from an articulation of
the implicit structure of the voluntary alternative when it is expanded to include a whole society.
I claim that law understood as an extension of human agreement is vastly different than law
understood as a function of habit and coercion, and that the rule of law is the inherent and
distinguishing characteristic of law understood as convention. Rule of law becomes the standard
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of voluntariness or conventionality by which rules and legal systems as a whole can be measured.
Variations from this standard tend to the coercive model.
The basic criterion of voluntariness or conventionality is unanimity. This is a strong
criterion, and becomes more complicated as the size of the group involved increases. The
assumption is that what people will agree to unanimously is uncoerced. Presumably, people
agree to a coordinated course of conduct with an expectation of realizing some benefit not
otherwise attainable and with assurance that any risks involved are limited and worth taking.
James M. Buchanan has helped us in his reflections on constitutional political economy to
understand unanimity as the basic test for voluntariness.32 Note that it is not necessary that
parties to an agreement expect benefits to be equally distributed. Nor is it necessary that they see
the object of their agreement as the ideal arrangement. They only need see it as their best option,
all things considered.
The major claim of this theory is that law rests on a fundamental convention or agreement
which creates the legal community and the authority to make rules binding on all community
members. Contrary to some economic approaches, including Buchanan's, it does not claim that
the foundations of political society can be adequately explained on an exchange or market model.
The community of law substitutes authority for unanimous agreement as the grounding of the
rules it produces. The power to make and enforce authoritative rules is assigned to public
officials whose formal positions are in turn defined by law and are not occupied by personal
right. Acting in these authoritative roles, public officials represent the entire community. To use
their public offices for personal advantage would subvert both the offices and the law. Their
official actions serve as substitutes for the unanimous agreement of the community as a whole.
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Seen in this way, constitutional requirements for different kinds of majorities do not aim at
approximating unanimity. Rather, they are prudential devices designed to reduce the likelihood
that the power granted to public authorities will become corrupted and misused)))advancing the
private interests of the public officials and using the lives the citizens for private advantage.
1. Constructive Unanimity and the Conditions of Conventionality.
The move from actual unanimity in social decision making to the establishment of legal
authority merely recognizes the practical impossibility of achieving complete agreement on a day
by day basis, as well as the temptation to hold out for inordinate concessions that the rule of
unanimity creates for individuals. Conventionalism claims that it is rational, given the
impossibility of achieving actual agreement on every rule that will necessarily affect all members
of the society, to concede one's veto over such rules and agree to institutions of authority on
certain conditions that will govern the future exercise of that authority. The creation of legal
authority is by definition unanimous as such authority only exists for those who agree to it and
choose to take advantage of its existence in their lives. Scholars who have studied the process of
social agreement have noted a number of general characteristics of such agreements. I have
elsewhere shown how these empirically identified characteristics of actual agreements can be
generalized as a set of abstract conditions of agreement.
One of those conditions is that the authority be constrained by a standard of constructive
unanimity, that is, that it be limited in its actions to creating and enforcing rules and procedures
that all members of the society might reasonably have agreed to in advance. This is not a
Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The assumption has to be that people knowing their actual
preferences, values, needs, and abilities could reasonably have agreed to let standards be laid
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down by public officials. This notion of constructive or ad hoc unanimity suggests the following
as implicit limits on all legal authority:
1.

Rules cannot violate the deeply held moral and religious beliefs of citizens. To the extent
that these are matters many people hold to be more important than anything else, it is not
reasonable to expect them to put these at risk in agreements made with others to improve
their situations in other respects. (This may limit the range of moral and religious views
that can share a single legal system. But note that it is a negative restraint only and does
not require complete moral and religious agreement. It does require religious liberty.)

2.

Authoritative decisions cannot arbitrarily single out individuals or groups for particular
penalties or benefits.

3.

The authorities themselves, in their private role as citizens and in their public roles as
magistrates, are subject to all the rules they create.

4.

There can only be one set of rules for everyone. There can be no special (privileged)
categories of citizens.

5.

Rules cannot be changed after the fact or made retroactive in their application without the
actual consent of all concerned or compensation to those negatively affected.

6.

All making and enforcement of rules must be knowable and observable by all citizens.

7.

Every citizen must have reasonable access to the process by which the rules are
formulated and administered.

8.

Every citizen must have full opportunity to defend his case when accused of rule
violations.
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Other conditions of such social conventions could be listed. This short list includes some
of the most important conditions of conventionality. The claim is that any social convention to
be ruled by law implicitly holds these as limitations on the authorities it creates. These are not
moral principles, but are conditions that protect constructive unanimity. It is reasonable to give
up one's veto to an authority that can be expected to act within these limitations.
2. The Principles of the Rule of Law.
The link between this kind of rational actor analysis and traditional natural law and rule
of law theories is that most of these conditions of conventionality can be expressed in terms of
the widely recognized principles of rule of law, particularly as these have been articulated by
Hayek and Fuller. Elements 1 and 7 on this list have not ordinarily been recognized in rule of
law discussions. The others are directly translatable into recognized rule of law principles as
follows:
2.

The principle of generality--all rules must be general in scope.

3.

The principle of generality--the rules must apply to everyone.

4.

The principle of equality--there cannot be more than one class of legal persons.

5.

The principle of prospectivity--new rules can only apply to the future.

6.

The principle of publicity--no secret rules or prosecutions are allowed.

8.

The principle of due process--all prosecutions must follow established rules which give
defendants and plaintiffs full opportunity to defend their actions and their interests.
On this analysis, the conditions of conventionality or constructive unanimity are

equivalent to the principles of the rule of law. Rule of law is revealed as an implicit norm or
standard for legal communities that understand law as agreement or convention rather than
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coercion or habit. Rule of law just means constructive unanimity or conventionality. This
includes, but goes far beyond the view that authority requires obedience to law. It also entails a
broad set of implicit limits on all authority. Not just anything can be a law. There are implicit
standards and limits in much the sense that natural lawyers have always wanted. But these
standards are not derived from moral principles which may or may not be supported with
consensus. Rather, they are derived from social facts, from individual choices made for whatever
reasons people (who may be presumed to act according to their own moral convictions and
interests) may have as they pursue what they consider to be important in their lives. Thus the
theory claims to transcend the recognized impasse in legal theory by basing law in social fact,
while identifying broad standards inherent in law.
IV. Rule of Law and Pareto Optimality.
On the analysis developed here, rule of law, like Pareto optimality, is a regulative norm.
In fact, rule of law may just be an extension of Pareto optimality into the legal sphere. This
possibility is glimpsed by returning to the two person exchange or agreement on a rule of mutual
conduct. At this level, a fully voluntary exchange is by definition Pareto optimal. But how do
we extend this measure of voluntariness into a sphere where the choices are being made by some
for all, especially given that most of the choices that are made in this way would have been
opposed by at least some of the people who are bound to them? The notion of constructive
unanimity carries us ahead to this level, which is necessary if these concepts are to be introduced
into a theory of law. Using this extended notion of rule of law we can now assess choices made
by authorities for the society in terms of "constructive unanimity." We can call a legal system
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conventional or voluntarist in a meaningful way that distinguishes it from other types of social
organization that are not based in voluntary choice.
Pareto optimality works well for analyzing a market because individuals are making their
own choices on a case by case basis. There are simply an infinite number of ad hoc adjustments
that individuals can work out between themselves, which reflect nothing but unanimous choices,
but which never require everyone to agree to any one thing. Private property and market
exchange make it possible for individuals to act unilaterally without any need for securing the
consensus of the society as a whole. But the law is a very different matter. For every rule must
by definition be general, and this makes it the business of every citizen. Legal society is also
more complex in that individuals delegate some of the most important choices in ways that
virtually guarantee that some of the outcomes will not be what they would in fact have chosen.
The notion of rule of law as developed here gives us a way of speaking of such situations as if
individuals had voluntarily agreed to specific rules. This is important because we still want to
distinguish between a political and legal system that is based in voluntariness and one that rests
on coercion.
The relatedness of the two criteria is also emphasized by the interesting fact that while
they are both social measurements or criteria, dealing with societies as a whole, neither one is
holistic. Rather each measure focuses on individuals and measures aggregatively in a way that
lets every individual count.
Attempts to use the Pareto criterion in legal analysis have tended toward contractual
models. Again, the problem may be the complexity involved in maintaining the sense of the
Pareto criterion when you move from the market situation of actual agreement between
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individuals and a legal society in which commitments are made by authorities. Another attempt
to get around the limitations of the Pareto criterion in this context is the Kaldor-Hicks test which
Posner and others have used to rationalize changes by making cost-benefit calculations and
paying off long run losers. This procedure is intended to yield a kind of "constructive consent."
The emphasis in these models is on actual costs and benefits, which can only be
calculated ex post facto. The rule of law model spelled out above provides a set of criteria that
can be used at any point in time, and therefore are available prospectively.
Oddly enough, even though Pareto optimality turns out to be less abstract or more basic
than rule of law, it is dependent on rule of law in the real world. There is little question that a
legal system exhibiting rule of law greatly enhances the voluntary choices necessary for Pareto
optimality to be realized. The market economy needs law as a precondition.
While the Pareto criterion is not usually thought of in terms of a set of general principles
or conditions that people can look to in improving their societies, there are plenty of economists
who believe there are general market principles which can profitably be observed by societies
that wish to raise their levels of Pareto efficiency. To the extent they are correct, the Pareto
criterion indirectly provides the kind of general guidance to free societies that rule of law offers.
But neither imposes a universal or maximizing rule. Rather, each protects individuals as the only
sources of value. It is from this perspective that it might be said that rule of law and Pareto
optimality are the same thing. Each is a measure of the extent to which individuals in a society
are able to use their lives for their own purposes, to pursue their self-chosen ends. The main
difference is that the Pareto criterion focuses on distribution issues while rule of law focuses on
the creation and administration of rules that govern all forms of individual conduct.
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